Recent Cases by unknown
Volume 60 




Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Recent Cases, 60 DICK. L. REV. 348 (1956). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol60/iss4/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
DICKINSON LAW REVIEWO
RECENT CASES
EVIDENCE-TESTIMONY OF A JUROR
TO IMPEACH A VERDICT
State v. Kociolek is one of four recent New Jersey Supreme Court four
to three decisions in which no dissenting opinion is reported.' The case, which
permitted an affidavit of a juror as to the "occurrence of an event" to upset
the verdict, presents a cogent summary of New Jersey law on the subject of
the oversimplified "rule" that a juror may not impeach the verdict.2
Two weeks before the trial of the defendant for murder, the jury panel
was in attendance in a court room where many defendants were being arraigned
on criminal charges.8 One of the men then arraigned, on an indictment for
"robbery and assault with intent to kill", was Kociolek. The offense there
charged was alleged to have occurred two days before the murder of one Ed-
wards-the crime for which Kociolek was to be tried in the instant case. That
indictment had "no connection whatever with the Edwards murder" and could
not have been shown at the murder trial for the purpose of showing that the de-
fendant, "being under indictment for allegedly committing another crime of a
like nature, would be likely to commit the Edwards murder," or "even for the
purpose of affecting defendant's credibility when he testified in his own behalf." 4
Trial Judge Leonard was aware of the existence of the prior alleged of-
fense and its publicity in connection with Kociolek's murder trial. Judge Leon-
ard's charge to the jury repeatedly stated that the jury must determine the mur-
der charge just from the facts presented at the trial: "You will be unjust in
every aspect of the case if you do not determine it solely upon the facts and
upon nothing else ...... The supreme court remarked that "the trial judge
here was especially vigilant to protect this defendant from that mishap."
Notwithstanding the judge's admonitions, the jury, after they had reached
the verdict of guilty but before they were able to agree on the penalty to be
imposed, recalled the indictment and plea entered by Kociolek two weeks be-
fore-although they incorrectly thought it had been for attrocious assault and
battery. Four members who had been arguing for a life sentence then sided
with the remainder of the jury and returned the verdict without a recommenda-
1 20 N. J. 92, 118 A.2d 812 (1955) ; the other three cases being Buccheri v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 118 A.2d 21 (1955) (workmens" compensation-full faith and credit); Application of
Reis, 119 A.2d 16 (N. J. 1955) (proceeding on petition for summary investigation into affairs
of township) ; In re Blake's Will, 120 A.2d 745 (N. J. 1956) (will contest-presumptions).
2 The court discusses the history of the rule since first set forth by Lord Mansfield in Vaise v.
Delaval, 1 T.R. 11 (K.B. 1785) in which jurors' affidavits of a decision based upon chance
were rejected.
8 Evidently the practice of having the jury panel in the courtroom where criminal pleas were
being entered had been adopted because of the lack of space in the courthouse. On oral argu.
ment the court directed the prosecutor to see that such practice is discontinued.




tion of life imprisonment-requiring a death sentence in New Jersey. Defense
counsel presented a motion for a new trial based upon an affidavit of a juror as
to the extraneous evidence which had been considered and its effect upon the
verdict. The trial judge denied the motion on the ground that the affidavit was
inadmissible.
On appeal to the supreme court the state argued that testimony of a juror
could not be received to upset the verdict. It then became relevant to consider
to what extent testimony of jurors had been admitted in New Jersey; the most
complete statement in this field had been written by Mr. Justice Brennan while
a judge of the superior court. Palestroni v. Jacobs6 involved a civil action on a
building contract. After retiring for their deliberations the jurors noticed the
word "wainscot" in the contract, requested a dictionary from the court, and
consulted it to ascertain the meaning of that word. Depositions were taken of
the jurors as to whether or not they had consulted the dictionary and also whether
the verdict had been influenced by the definition. As to the latter point it was
"plain the depositions .... were wholly incompetent." 7  The jurors' testi-
mony was permitted, however, to show the objective fact that the dictionary
had been consulted. The court relied upon and discussed previous cases involving
dictionaries. 8
The Palestroni and Kociolek decisions raise serious doubts as to the value
of old New Jersey cases holding jurors' testimony inadmissible to show that
the verdict was reached by chance. 9 Where testimony has been rejected as in-
volving the jurors' mental processes, however, no change is contemplated by
the instant case. The reason for continuing exclusion in such cases is succinctly
stated by the court: 10
"The better reasoned decisions support the exclusion of jurors'
testimony as to their mental processes, not upon the discredited basis
of the policies against self-stultification and avoidance of jury tamper-
ing, perjury or other fraudulent practices, but upon the sounder ground
that, being personal to each juror, the working of the mind of any of
them cannot be subjected to the test of other testimony, and therefore
that such testimony should not be received to overthrow the verdict to
which all assented."
6 10 N.J. Super. 266, 77 A.2d 183 (1950).
7 The same conclusion was reached in the instant case, 118 A.2d at 818, wherein the court
stated: "The statements therein as to the actual effect of the consideration of the indictment up-
on the jurors' minds must, however, be rejected, and we have neither quoted such statements
nor relied upon them in reaching our conclusion."
s In re Phelan, 126 N.J.L. 410, 19 A.2d 792 (1941) ("undue influence") ; In re Collins
Will, 18 N.J. Misc. 492, 15 A.2d 98 (1940) ("undue influence"); Long v. Payne, 198 App.
Div. 667, 190 N.Y.S. 803 (1921) ("assume").
9 Brewster v. Thompson, 1 N.J.L. 32 (Sup. Ct. 1790), Kennedy v. Kennedy, 18 N.J.L. 450
(Sup. Ct. 1842); in regard to these cases Mr. Justice Brennan refers to "implacably" applying
the rule of exclusion.
10 State v. Kociolek, supra, 118 A.2d at 814; for examples of such cases involving men-
tal processes see Bragg v. King, 104 N.J.L. 4, 139 At. 884 (1928) (misunderstanding of court's
charge); Marconi v. MacElliott, 8 N.J. Misc. 69, 148 Atl. 392 (1928) (misinterpretation of
exhibit); cf. Lindauer v. Teeter, 41 N.J.L. 255 (1879).
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In reaching its decision the supreme court did not rely alone upon New
Jersey precedents, but quoted extensively from the opinion of Chief Justice
Fuller of the United States Supreme Court in Mattox v. United States" and look-
ed to other jurisdictions for modern statements on Lord Mansfield's old rule.
12
The role of the Uniform Rules of Evidence is also important because of the con.
sideration of them by the state supreme court' 3 and by committees of the leg-
islature and the state bar association appointed to consider revision of the rules
of evidence.' 4 Mr. Justice Brennan cites Uniform Rules 41 and 44 with the
comment that they are "consistent with the holding in the Palestroni case." 15
The importance of the Kociolek decision does not lie in that it makes any
particular inroads in the much discussed rule of exclusion, for the probability
is that it merely extends the principles underlying the decisions in civil cases
to the criminal field. The difficulty, however, is that one cannot be certain
whether the decision indicates possible changes in existing law. To what extent
may jurors' testimony be received in future cases? More important, what stand-
ard is to be applied in determining whether a particular affidavit concerns "overt
acts"' 16 or "mental processes"? Professor Wigmore has referred to this problem
as "an arguable question"'17 and the existence of a four to three decision does
not help the situation. Without a dissenting opinion to assist in explaining the
closeness of the vote, it is difficult to know what slight change of facts might
shift the balance of power. Because one must speculate on the reasons for the
closeness of the decision the following factors are presented, with the sugges-
tion that a change of any one might result in rejection of a juror's testimony in
a future case.18
First, the state did not challenge the truth of the contents of the affidavit.
The entire contention of the prosecutor was that the affidavit was inadmissible.
On oral argument, in answer to a question from the court, the prosecutor ad-
mitted that if the affidavit was correct, the defendant had been prejudiced. Thus,
in addition to what Mr. Justice Brennan denominates "prejudice inherent on
11 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
12 See for example: State v. McCormick, 57 Kan. 440, 46 Pac. 777 (1896), where one juror
had stated during deliberations that defendant had been convicted in former trial; Richards v.
State, 36 Neb. 17, 53 N.W. 1027 (1893), during deliberations in rape case two jurors had
stated that defendant had "ruined other girls" and should be convicted on general principles;
and see 20 A.L.R. 1187; 67 A.L.R. 1523; 39 AM. JUR., New Trial, § 81 (1942).
13 See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE TO THE SU-
PREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY (May, 1955).
14 79 N.J.L.J. 97 (Legislative commission) ; 79 N.J.L.J. 36 (State Bar Association committee).
15 See REPORT, note 13 supra, at pp. 88, 89, 91-93.
16 State v. Kociolek, supra, 118 A.2d at 816, citing Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 544 (1874).
17 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2353 (3rd ed. 1940): "Whether a given piece of conduct during
retirement shall be classed as a formal and fatal irregularity (which may be proved) or as an
erroneous ground of the verdict (which may not be proved) is often an arguable question . . . ;
but that is very different from the question whether, conceding that it is a fatal irregularity,
the juror alone is to be prohibited from proving it."
18 References to oral argument are made from notes taken by this author at the hearing, No.
vember 8, 1955, and he accepts responsibility for their accuracy.
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the face of the matter," there was an admission of prejudice by the state. Will
a different result be reached if the matter of prejudice is not admitted?
Second, the court states: "It should be remarked that in the instant case
the event which set in motion the chain of events . . . occurred outside the
jury room . . .", and the presence of the jury panel in the courtroom when the
defendant's plea was taken "was confirmed in depositions of court officers al-
so filed in support of the motion for a new trial." In the Palestroni'9 case
there was evidence, apart from jurors' testimony, that the dictionary had been
delivered to the jury. It is submitted that both decisions, apart from dicta,
leave undecided the question of a possible different result where the "condition
or occurrence" takes place wholly within the jury room-notwithstanding the
court's reference to proposed Uniform Rule 44.20
The third factor concerns another admission by the prosecutor which is
not included in the reported opinion. The state asserted that the jury's discus-
sion of the prior indictment was the operation of "mental processes" rather
than an "objective event". The author of the majority opinion asked the prose-
cutor if the result would be any different if, instead of a remark by a juror call-
ing attention to the prior indictment, the indictment itself (the actual sheet of
paper with plea endorsed) had found its way to the jury room. The state con-
ceded that the tangible document would be an "existing condition", thus per-
mitting testimony by a juror to the fact that it was on the jury room table. In
view of the fact that Kociolek was equally prejudiced whether a tangible in-
dictment was on the table or its existence recalled verbally by a juror, it was
a logical step for the court to allow the affidavit. Thus, in determining whether
words of a juror are "objective" or "mental processes", it may be relevent to
consider whether the words could have taken the form of a tangible document
as the indictment in this case. Proponents of the rule of exclusion may well
argue that admission of jurors' testimony as to what was said in the jury room
should be limited to cases where the words represent a tangible document which
itself, if present, would be admissible and prejudicial.
On the surface the problem of determining admissibility would seem to
involve a balancing of conflicting policies: (1) excluding juror testimony in
order to uphold the validity of verdicts and to make the verdict as uttered the
final determination; 21 and (2) the policy of providing justice in each individ-
ual case. As a practical matter these two policies are brought into conflict in
particular cases, especially where prejudice is patent and conceded. In theory,
19 See note 6 supra.
20 State v. Kociolek, supra, 118 A.2d at 816, 818; and see Falknor, Extrinsic Policie.r
Affecting Admissibility, 10 RUTG. L. REV. 574, 598, where Professor Falknor, writing for Rutgers'
excellent Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence, comments upon Rules 41 and 44 and
concludes: "The Uniform Rules thus fall short of sanctioning the admissibility of jurors' testi-
mony as to misconduct, either within or without the jury room; the question is to be resolved
independently of the Rules."
21 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2353 (3rd ed. 1940).
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however, it is not until the testimony has been determined to be admissible as
within the concept of an "objective event" that the question of prejudice arises.
Admissibility and prejudice are separate, distinct questions. Strict logic, there-
fore, shows that the two policies cannot conflict; the second cannot arise until
the first has been determined. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the majority in
the instant case pragmatically answered the second question before the first, and
from the following excerpt it would appear that the existence of prejudice
was used as a partial justification for receiving the affidavit: 22
". .. but receiving their evidence as to the existence of the con-
dition or the happening of the event, particularly when the consequences
are governed according to whether capacity for adverse prejudice in-
heres in the condition or event itself supplies evidence which can be
put to the test of other testimony (and thus sound policy is satisfied)
and at the same time the evidence can serve to avert, as here, a grave
miscarriage of justice, which it is certainly the first duty of a court of
conscience to prevent if at all possible." (Emphasis added.)
It appears, therefore, that although there is a two-step process involved
in determining admissibility and prejudice, the court felt that only by con-
sidering the steps simultaneously, or in inverse order, might it fulfill its "firse
duty". This is seen further in the court's reference to the fact that the prior
indictment would have been inadmissible at the trial and "if such extraneous
prejudicial matter was erroneously admitted in evidence at the trial," it would
have caused the granting of a new trial. Thus the law "cannot tolerate the de-
feat of justice which would result from the indefensible exclusion of [a] juror's
testimony as to the incident . "23 It is submitted that the fact that the
indictment could not have been introduced at the trial does not affect the ob-
jective character of the juror's testimony and does not provide a standard for
determining admissibility. The dictionary definition of "wainscot" in the Pale-
stroni case could have been introduced at that trial; it was the fact that it had
not been so introduced-and thus counsel had had no chance to rebut or ex-
plain the particular definition-that made prejudice inhere in the jury's con-
sideration of the definition in closed session. 24 It would appear unfortunate
that Mr. Justice Brennan introduced this consideration as additional justifica-
tion for the decision. It would seem to say that the standard for determining
admissibility would be prejudice, or the "defeat of justice", but such standard
would open the judicial door to receipt of jurors' testimony in the unsound rea-
soning, misunderstanding of the charge, and misinterpretation of exhibit cases
22 State v. Kociolek, supra, 118 A.2d at 816; it is surmised that the minority considered
the questions in the logical order. Mr. Justice Wachenfeld, a dissenting member of the court,
had asked the prosecutor how one may show that the extraneous matter was considered if not
by the testimony of a juror. To the answer that in this case there was no other way, Justice
Wachenfeld replied to the effect that the problem became difficult for a court of justice because
prejudice was conceded.
28 State v. Kociolek, supra, 118 A.2d at 818.
24 See note 6 supra.
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which also involve prejudice to a party.25 When the decision is read as a whole,
however, it seems apparent that "prejudice" is not offered as a test.
The difficulties which may be encountered in applying the decision in the
Kociolek case to future fact situations point up the need for codification of
the rules of evidence in New Jersey. In this respect it would seem important
for the various committees studying such revision to note that the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, while providing the "objective events" and "mental process-
es" distinctions, provide no standard for determining the difficult problem of
classification.
It is submitted that the court has not opened the door to the proverbial
"flood of litigation" and impeachment of jury verdicts, as may be feared by pro-
ponents of a strict rule of exclusion. Rather, the court has applied existing rules
of permitting jurors' testimony as to objective events to the field of criminal
law. The concept of a "court of conscience" would appear to be more compell-
ing where a life is at stake than where there is a civil dispute and the jury seeks
to define "wainscot".
HARMAN R. CLARK, JR.
25 See cases in note 10 rupra.
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TORTS-SLANDER PER SE-CHARGE OF COMMUNISM
In 1953 on the verdict of a jury, judgment was rendered adversely to the
defendant, a school board director, Methodist, and prominent citizen of Myers-
dale. Plaintiff, a medical doctor of the Jewish faith and of foreign birth, was
also a prominent citizen of Myersdale. Plaintiff complained that on three separ-
ate public occasions the defendant accused the plaintiff of being a communist.
Plaintiff contended that according to a Pennsylvania statute the defendant's charges
imputed a crime punishable by imprisonment and as such constituted slander
per se. Defendant urged that the statute made only membership in the Com-
munist Party a crime and that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had set a prec-
edent which said that to call a man a communist was not to defame him. The
Pennsylvania .Supreme Court, on the defendant's appeal, affirmed the judgment
of the lower court for the plaintiff.1
The court disposed of the defendant's contentions by holding that to charge
one with being a communist could be for no other purpose than to leave in
the minds of people the impression that the accused was a member of the Com-
munist Party.2 Secondly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania never decided
that it was not defamatory to call a person a communist. The court's statement
to that effect had been merely obiter dicta, 3 made at a time when the public
mind had not yet discerned that communism was the driving force behind Rus-
sian imperialism and terrorism.
4
A brief summary of the judicial and legislative action which preceded the
court's decision will be of help in understanding how the court was led to de-
cide as it did in the principal case. In 1950 the court was undecided as to
whether the charge of communism was defamatory. It held that words which
implied that the plaintiff was sympathetic toward communism were not defam-
atory and by way of obiter dicta stated that to charge a man with being a com-
munist or socialist was not defamatory. 5 In so doing the court reversed both
the trial court and the Superior Court.6 There was a dissenting opinion which
was well supported by holdings which showed that courts in other jurisdic-
tions were not in accord. 7 In 1949 a federal district court recognized that it
1 Solosko v. Paxton, 119 A.2d 230 (Pa. 1956).
2 Americans for Democratic Action v. Meade, 72 Pa. D. & C. 306 (1950); Mencher v. Ches-
ley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E. 2d 257 (1947).
3 McAndrew v. Scranton Republican Publishing Co., 364 Pa. 504, 514, 72 A.2d 780, 784 (1950).
4 Although the court used this to distinguish the Solosko case from the McAndrew case, it is
felt that sentiment in 1946 and the period thereafter was none too favorable toward Com-
munism. See Americans for Democratic Action v. Meade, 72 Pa. D. & G. 306, 313 (1950).
6 McAndrew v. Scranton Republican Publishing Co., 364 Pa. 504, 514, 72 A.2d 780, 784 (1950).
6 The opinion of the Superior Court is found in 165 Pa. Super. 276, 67 A.2d 730 (1949).
7 McAndrew v. Scranton Republican Publishing Co., 364 Pa. 504, 519, 72 A.2d 780 (1950);
Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257, 259 (1947) ; Grant v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n., Inc., 151 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619, 621 (7th Cir.
1947). Also see Utah State Farm Bureau Federation v. National Farmers Union Service Corp.,
198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1952), 33 A.L.R. 2d 1186 (1952).
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was slander per se to charge a government economist with being a communist. 8
At this time an Act of Congress made it a crime to knowingly or wilfully advo-
cate the overthrow or destruction of the United States government by force or
violence or to conspire to do so. 9 The United States Supreme Court on Decem-
ber 4, 1950, took judicial notice that the Communist Party advocated the violent
overthrow of the United States government. 10 In light of these events it ap-
pears that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ignored existing social norms" and
judicial opinion to render a decision which had little validity. Acknowledging
the serious nature of the charge of being a communist, in 1950 a Pennsylvania
trial court held that the charge was capable of defamatory meaning.' 2 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in 1951 took judicial notice of the fact that com-
munism as a political movement was dedicated to the overthrow of the United
States government and the government of each state by force and violence. 13
On December 21, 1951, the Pennsylvania Legislature, after considering the dire
threat of communism to democratic government, the recent tendency of courts
to recognize that threat, and the general public sentiment against communism,
passed an act which made membership in the Communist Party a felony, pun-
ishable by twenty years imprisonment or ten thousand dollars fine or both. 14
In 1952 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court shifted ground and recognized that
the charge of being a communist was libelous per se but found for the defendant
because the accusation was privileged. 15 When the court decided the principal
case there was little doubt as to the general public distrust and hatred of com-
munism or the consequences for any one who should be so unfortunate to be
classified as a communist.
The Florida Supreme Court in 1953 found that the charge of communism
could do such harm to one's reputation that it was held slander per se. 16 The
Florida Statutes described the Communist Party as a conspiracy organized to
overthrow democratic government. However, the statute did not make member-
ship in the party a crime. It simply required a loyalty oath by public officials. 17
In spite of this, the court held that to call one a communist was synonymous
with calling one a traitor and constituted slander per se.
Later in 1953 the Missouri Supreme Court found that it was slander per
8 Remington v. Bentley, 88 F.Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
9 Smith Act, 54 STAT. 671 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
10 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1950).
11 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1282. REISMAN, DEMOCRACY AND DEFAMATION 1304, indicates that as
early as 1940 polls revealed that Communism was universally detested in the United States.
12 Americans for Democratic Action v. Meade, 72 Pa. D. & C. 306 (1950).
18 Milasinovich v. Serbian Progressive Club, Inc., 369 Pa. 26, 84 A.2d 571 (1951); Com. v.
Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 81, 91, 84 A.2d 571 (1951).
14 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3811 (Purdon 1955).
15 Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, (1952).
16 Joopanenko v. Gavagan, 67 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1953).
17 Joopanenko v. Gavagan, 67 So. 2d 434, 438 (Fla. 1953).
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se to accuse a person of being a communist even though the state had no stat-
ute making it a felony to be a member of the Party.
18
The court held that the federal statutes made it a felony to advocate the
overthrow of the United States government; and since the Tederal courts recog-
nized that the Communist Party supported such doctrines, then Missouri would
recognize that words charging or imputing the commission of a crime under
the laws of another jurisdiction would be slander per se.19
The New York and Ohio courts were not as resourceful as those of Florida
and Missouri. Both New York and Ohio recognized that the charge of com-
munism submitted the accused to public hatred, ridicule and contempt by the
great majority of American citizens; yet they held that without a statute making
it a felony to be a member of the Communist Party, the accused had no remedy
in slander unless he alleged special damages.
20
The foregoing facts might make it appear that an appeal for the abolition
of the differences between libel and slander would be the best way to deal with
the problem. However, it is not felt that this would be valid. 21 Much more effec-
tive is the appeal that the legislature should take steps to deal with mat-
ters such as communism which stir up bitter public sentiment and are capable
of creating lasting tensions in society. The legislatures by recognizing the threat
of communism would give the courts a firm basis for punishing those who
would use violence to destroy democracy and allow protection for those who
would be accused falsely. In the case of New York and Ohio where the legisla-
tive machinery appears to be so ponderous that a force may threaten its very
existence for no less than ten years and yet fail to move that body to action,
then in that case the judiciary should take the initiative. On the issue of mak-
ing the charge of communism slander per se, the courts were not without author-
ity. Federal jurisdiction provided for this.2 2 Labor leaders, whose work makes
them appear a little left of the center, have suffered injustice because the courts
could offer them no remedy for the communist smear which has been used
against them quite frequently.23 Thus, it would be well for other courts to
note the example set by the Florida and Missouri courts. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court carried out the intention of the statute by imposing upon the de-
fendant the serious nature of his charges. Here the court effectively discouraged
18 Lightfoot v. Jennings, 254 S.W. 2d 596 (Mo. 1953).
19 Lightfoot v. Jennings, 254 S.W. 2d 596, 597 (Mo. 1953). See Mo. REV. STTr. § 559.400
(1949).
20 Gross v. Mallamud, 200 Misc. 5, 108 N.Y.S. 2d 822 (1951); Weinstock v. Ladisky, 197
Misc. 859, 864, 98 N.Y.S. 2d 85, 91 (1950) ; Pecyk v. Semoncheck, 105 N.E. 2d 61 (Ohio 1952).
21 Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 175 N.E. 505 (1931). Mr. Justice Cardozo shows a difference
between libel and slander based on the permanent nature of libel.
22 Smith Act, 54 STAT. 671 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952). See Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1950).
23 Pecyk v. Semoncheck, 105 N.E. 2d 61 (Ohio 1952) ; Keefe v. O'Brien, 203 Misc. 113,
116 N.Y.S. 2d 286 (1952); Krumholz v. Raffer, 195 Misc. 788, 91 N.Y.S. 2d 743 (1949).
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the political ultraconservative and the crank from using the label of commu-
nism to plague the political liberal and the innocent.
Some would argue that the court's decision hampers free speech and pre-
vents a searching out of those who would destroy democracy. 24 In fact the
effect of the decision will be two fold. It will encourage our law enforcement
agencies to do a more efficient job and deter self appointed inquisitors and
witch hunters whose activity generally results in mob action and works to the
detriment of democracy.
In deciding the principal case the court was careful not to open a breach
for promiscuous law suits. Charging a person with being a communist was made
slander per se within a narrow set of circumstances. In the Soloska case the de-
fendant was not the town gossip nor a notorious blabber mouth. The defend-
ant was a man of descretion, a prominent citizen, whose word was respected
by many. The defendant made charges he could not support. These charges
had the potential to do great harm to the plaintiff, a member of a minority
group and born in a country dominated by the U.S.S.R. 25 The words used by
the defendant were not the result of a fit of anger nor were they merely abu-
sive. The defendant made a calculated attempt to use the communist label as
a means to smear the plaintiff's good reputation in the town. In view of these
circumstances it is felt that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided an excel-
lent precedent for future cases and was well justified in finding for the plain-
tiff.
BLYTHE H. EVANS, JR.
24 Keefe v. O'Brien, supra note 22.
25 Solosko v. Paxton, 119 A.2d 230 (Pa. 1956).
